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 We introduce in this paper a new identity-based threshold signature (IBTHS) 
technique, which is based on a pair of intractable problems, residuosity and 
discrete logarithm. This technique relies on two difficult problems and offers 
an improved level of security relative to an on two difficult hard problems.  
The majority of the denoted IBTHS techniques are established on an 
individual difficult problem. Despite the fact that these methods are secure, 
however, a prospective solution of this sole problem by an adversary will 
enable him/her to recover the entire private data together with secret keys 
and configuration values of the associated scheme. Our technique is immune 
to the four most familiar attack types in relation to the signature schemes. 
Enhanced performance of our proposed technique is verified in terms of 
minimum cost of computations required by both of the signing algorithm and 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In 1971, the idea of digital signature was first presented by Diffie and Helman [1] that enabled  
a signer in possession of a secrete key to sign a message, while anybody using a public key could perform 
verification of the signature. The notion of threshold signatures was presented by Desmedt [2] in 1987.  
A secret key, and correspondingly, the signing power, is shared to a collection of 𝑛 players in a (𝑡,𝑛) 
threshold signature scheme, where this is accomplished in a manner that any subset of 𝑡 players is able to 
collectively deliver a signature on the account of the group, whereas a subset composed of up to 𝑡−1 players 
is incapable. The threshold signature is fundamental yet of a great significance cryptographic scheme that is 
due to its bifold function: by boosting the opportunity of the signing agency while simultaneously improving 
the safeguarding process against fraudulence through completing the learn process of the secret signature key 
for the antagonist. Subsequent to Desmedt’s creation, in the commonly-named threshold cryptography 
domain, several threshold signature approaches incorporated on diverse premise were formulated, such  
as [3-8]. In order to streamline key management processes in certificate based public key setting, Shamir [9] 
in 1984, called for identity-based (ID-based) encryption and signature methods. Thenceforth, in the scope of 
this commonly-named ID-based cryptography, scores of identity-based cryptography techniques were put 
forward, such as the works of [10, 11]. The remarkably prominent tool has proposed bilinear pairing [10] in 
constructing identity-based cryptography primitives, where ID-based could be substituted for certificate-
based in public key setting. This is of a special interest particularly when there is a requirement for efficient 
key management while moderate security is needed. The entire developed literature put forward on ID-based 
threshold group signature contains approaches that rely on an individual hard problem such as factoring, 
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discrete logarithm or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [1-20]. Hereafter, if a solution of any of these 
problems is achieved, then the security of the associated ID-based threshold group signature would be 
compromised. Therefore, we present in this work a secure ID-based threshold group signature incorporated 
on discrete logarithms and residuosity problem. Our techniques enhancement arises from the difficulty in 
finding simultaneous solution of both problems. We demonstrate that our approach persists to be secure, 
despite attaining solution of one of the problems. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the 
IBTHS is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents security analysis of our technique. Performance study 
and resultant efficiency are carried out in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5. 
 
 
2. THE PROPOSED IBTHS  
Here, we will introduce our identity based threshold signature technique that relies on a pair of hard 
number theoretical problems; namely, residuosity and discrete logarithm. As was stated, the security if this 
technique builds on the premise that it is burdensome to simultaneously achieve solutions of this pair of 
problems. The framework of our technique presumes, 𝑡 out of 𝑛 signers are able to jointly sign the message 
on the account of the group, whereas an individual verifier is able to corroborate the group signature [21]. 
 
2.1.  System setup  
The trusted dealer (TD) of the system, following the framework of [21], selects a large prime  
𝑝- a 1024-bits, 𝑁 = 𝑝1𝑞1 is a factor of 𝑝 − 1, where 𝑝1 and 𝑞1 are two safe primes, an element 𝑔 generator of 
order 𝑁, adhering to 𝑔𝑁 ≡ 1 (mod 𝑝) , and where ℎ(𝑚) is the one-way hash function for the message 𝑚. 
 
2.2.  Generating keys 
Within this stage, TD carries-out the consecutive operations [21] to produce the secret and public 
keys of the technique: 
- Selects in a random fashion: 𝜆 ∈ 𝑧𝑁
∗  such that gcd(𝜆2, 𝑁) = 1 
- Calculate 𝛼 ≡ 𝑔𝜆
2
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
- After that, construct a (𝑡, 𝑛) threshold function 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑎∘ + 𝑎1𝑥 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑡−1𝑥
𝑡−1(mod 𝑁), where 𝑎𝑖 
are random integers between 1 and 𝑁 − 1, and 𝑖 = 0,1,2, … , 𝑡 − 1 
- Set the group secret key (0) , then compute the associated group public key 𝑌 = 𝑔𝑓(0)(mod 𝑝) 
- Each of the group members picks an integer 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) in a random manner as his private key and 
calculates his public key: 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑥𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
- Each participant registers an identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 and then sends 𝐼𝐷𝑖 to TD.  
- After TD obtains the complete identities, s/he calculates: 𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) and 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖)(mod p) and forwards 
𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) to the group’s members individually. Public 𝑌𝑖 and retain a copy of (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ), 𝑌𝑖 . 
In the event that an extra member 𝑢𝑖 wishes to participate within the group following negotiation 
with the TD, s/he posts her/his identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 to the TD. After which, TD calculates and transmits 𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) to 
her/him. Then, TD calculates and publics: 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖)(mod p). The public and secret keys for an individual 
represented as (𝑌𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖)  (𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖) , 𝑥𝑖) , respectively. While for group, the public and secret keys are (𝛼, 𝑌) and 
(𝜆, 𝑓(0)) , respectively. 
 
2.3.  (t,n) Threshold signature generation phase  
Consider a scenario where the 𝑡 members that cooperate in producing the signature [21] 
are 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑡 . Ahead to their collaborative signature of the message, a selected member is appointed as  
a clerk to perform partial signature verification. The sequential steps of message signing are illustrate as 
follows: 
a. Each signer selects 𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑧𝑁
∗  and computes  
 
 𝑟𝑖 ≡  𝑔
𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)  (1) 
 
b. The {𝑟𝑖} broadcasted to members by means of a channel that is secure. When entire 𝑟𝑖 are acquired, they 
are utilized collectively in the computation of the value 𝑅 as  
 
𝑅 = ∏ 𝑟𝑖
𝑡








𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖 𝑅) mod 𝑁  (3) 
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Then send 𝑅 along with (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) as the partial signature for the hash-function message ℎ(𝑚) to the clerk. 
Later, the clerk performs validation of the partial signature through demonstrating that the subsequent 
equality is fulfilled:  
 
 𝑔𝜈𝑖  𝑟𝑖
𝑅 = 𝑌𝑖




 (mod 𝑝)  (4) 
 
d. Following demonstrating the validity of all partial signatures by the clerk, s/he obtains solution for: 
 
 𝑉2 = 𝜆−2 ∑ 𝜈𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁) for 𝑉  (5) 
 
and the signature of message 𝑚 is {𝑅, 𝑉} .  
 
2.4.  (t,n) Threshold signature verification phase  
The signature can be verified by a stranger pending that s/he can get a hold of to the public key [21]. 




𝑅𝑅 = 𝑌ℎ(𝑚) (mod 𝑝)  (6) 
 
If this condition is fulfilled, accordingly the group signature is valid. 











 𝑅𝑅  (mod 𝑝) 
 
 ≡ 𝑔∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  𝑅𝑅   
 
 ≡ 𝑔







 𝑅𝑅  
 
  𝑔









𝑖=1  𝑅𝑅  
 
 ≡  (𝑔

















𝑅−𝑅𝑅𝑅 (mod 𝑝)  
 
 ≡ 𝑌ℎ(𝑚) (mod 𝑝)         (7) 
 
 
3. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
We demonstrate here that the presented scheme for identity–based threshold signature is unforgeable 
found on the complexity of finding solutions simultaneous to the pair of hard number theoretical problems; 
residuosity and discrete logarithm. Forth while, we shall substantiate that our technique is heuristically secure 
against example cryptographic attacks [21]. 
Attack 1: Suppose that the adversary (Adv) attempts to acquire the secret keys 𝜆, 𝑓(0) taken from  
the equations 𝛼 ≡ 𝑔𝜆
2
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) and = 𝑔𝑓(0)(mod 𝑝) . It is evidently infeasible in view of the hindrance of 
figuring out residuosity and discrete logarithm problems. Also Adv cannot derive the secret key 𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) from 
the equation 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖)(mod p) by virtue of the complication of solving DLP. 
Attack 2: Assume that the discrete logarithm problem can be figured-out. 
- By means of the equation 𝛼𝑉
2
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) , Adv can find 𝑉2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁). Nonetheless, s/he is still incapable of 
recovering 𝑉 because of the adversity of solving residuosity problem. 
- Adv may likewise attempt to figure-out the entire secret keys of the signer utilizing the relationship  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖)(mod p). Considering that discrete logarithm can be figured-out, at that point s/he can 
discover all secret keys (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) , and thereafter construct the entire partial signature of the group. Although, 
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s/he is unable to identify the group signature 𝑉 through the relationship 𝑉2 = 𝜆−2 ∑ 𝜈𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁) due 
to the fact that s/he is not aware of the prime factorization of 𝑁. 
Attack 3: Assume that the residuosity problem is solvable. In this situation, s/he has knowledge of the prime 
factorization, 𝑝1and 𝑞1. Consequently, s/he will attempt to figure-out the formula 𝜏 ≡ 𝛼
𝑉2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
Nevertheless, s/he remains incapable of figuring-out 𝑉 relying on this condition due to the fact that s/he is not 
aware of 𝑉2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁) for the reason that a discrete logarithm problem can not be unraveled. 
Attack 4: Adv can in addition attempt to gather 𝑡 pairs of message –signature (𝑟𝑖𝑗 , 𝑣𝑖𝑗) and 𝑚𝑗 where 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑡 also tries to seek-out the individual secret key (𝐼𝐷𝑖) . Meanwhile, Adv possesses 𝑡 equations in 
this fashion: 
 





− 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖1 𝑅1) 
 
 





− 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖2 𝑅2) 
 
 





− 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑡) 
(8) 
 
The number of unknowns is (𝑡 + 2) in the previous 𝑡 formulas of (8), i.e., (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) , 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑘𝑖𝑗. Hence, 
𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) and 𝑥𝑖 remain complex to identify considering that Adv can reproduce a limited number of solutions 
to this set of linear equations although s/he is not capable of identifying which is the right one. 
Attack 5: Adv could seek to pose as signer 𝑢𝑖 by choosing in a random fashion integers 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖 and announcing 
g 𝑟𝑖 ≡ 𝑔
𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). Because the entire 𝑡 signers decided on the group signature, in the absence of 
knowledge of the respective secret key 𝑓(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ), Adv is incapable of generating a correct partial signature 
(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) to fulfill the verification formula.  
Attack 6: Adv may contend to evolve a group signature (𝑉, 𝑅) of his own using the verifying equation 
𝛼𝑉
2
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑌ℎ(𝑚)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) for a specific message 𝑚 through fixing one integer, while seeking to identify 
the other. In this scenario, Adv picks 𝑅 and seeks the value of 𝑉. Adv begins by calculating 
𝜌 ≡ 𝑌ℎ(𝑚)𝑅−𝑅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) and finding 𝜌 ≡ 𝛼𝑉
2
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) for 𝑉 . Unsuccessfully, s/he is unable to figure-out 𝑉 
utilizing this equation because of the adversity of figuring-out, simultaneously, the residuosity and discrete 
logarithm problems. In addition, Adv could attempt to set 𝑉 and figure-out 𝑅. In this situation, s/he computes 
𝜇 ≡ 𝑌ℎ(𝑚)𝛼−𝑉
2
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) and seeks out a solution to  𝜇 ≡ 𝑅𝑅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). This scenario is the worst due to 
the fact that although both problems of residuosity and discrete logarithm can be solved, the 𝑅 value remains 




4. PERFORMANCE EVALUTION  
To investigate the performance of identity-based threshold signature, computation and 
communication overheads will be used to estimate it. Here, we will examine primarily the performance of 
our suggested technique. To facilitate this treatment, we employ the following notations in our analysis of  
the computation and communication complexity [22-25]. The number of secret and public keys are denoted 
by SK and PK, respectively. Modular exponentiation time is represented by; 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 , while 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 stands for 
the time for modular multiplication; and the time for a modular inverse computation is represented by  
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 ; 𝑇𝑠𝑞 denotes complexity of time for executing computation of the modular square; 𝑇𝑠𝑞𝑟 presents  
the complexity for executing calculation of the modular square root. 𝑇ℎ determines the one map-to-point hash 
function time, while |𝑥| specifies the length of bits of 𝑥. We must note that other computational operations 
times are ignored, since they are much smaller than 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 , 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 ,  𝑇𝑠𝑞 and 𝑇ℎ . We summarize the computation 
and communication cost of our proposed scheme in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, the computation 
complexity [22] for signature and verification are 4𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + (4𝑡
2 + 𝑡 + 1)+(𝑡2 − 𝑡 + 1)𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 + 𝑇𝑠𝑞 + 𝑇𝑠𝑞𝑟 +
𝑇ℎand 3𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 + 𝑇𝑠𝑞 + 𝑇ℎ in our scheme, respectively. Also the total communication cost are 
(2𝑡 + 1)|𝑁| + (3𝑡 + 1)|𝑝|. 
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Table 1. The performance of our scheme 
Criteria  Evaluation 
No. of keys SK 2𝑡 + 1 
PK 2t+1 
Computational complexity Sign 4𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + (4𝑡
2 + 𝑡 + 1)𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 +(𝑡
2 − 𝑡 + 1)𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 + 𝑇𝑠𝑞 + 𝑇𝑠𝑞𝑟 + 𝑇ℎ 
Verify 3𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 + 𝑇𝑠𝑞 + 𝑇ℎ 




To illustrate the proposed scheme, we consider that there are three users. The trusted dealer (TD)  
of the system choose 𝑝 = 14447, 𝑝1 = 31, 𝑝2 = 233, then 𝑁 =  𝑝1𝑝2 = 7223 , 𝑔 = 8 and ℎ(𝑚) = 801.  
The following step illustrate our scheme. 
 
5.1.  Keys generation  
In this step, the subsequent actions are carried-out by TD to generate the scheme’s secret and public keys: 
a. Selects in a random fashion 𝜆 = 223 ∈ 𝑧𝑁
∗  and observing that gcd(𝜆2, 𝑁) = 1. Calculate 𝛼 ≡
86391mod14447 ≡ 8853 mod 14447. Select a polynomial 𝑓(𝑥) = 311 + 733𝑥 + 123𝑥2( mod 7223) . 
Set the group secret key 𝑓(0) = 311 and calculates the corresponding group public key 𝑌 =
8311 mod 14447 ≡ 10022 mod 14447 .  
b. Each of the three members of the group, in a random fashion, picks an integer as: 𝑥1 = 163 , 𝑥2 =
237 , 𝑥3 = 757 , to represent his private key, and then determines his public key 𝑦1 =
8163 mod 14447 ≡ 5619, 𝑦2 ≡ 8
237 mod 14447 ≡ 2811, 𝑦3 ≡ 8
757 mod 14447 ≡ 1670.  
c. Each participant registers an identity 𝐼𝐷1 = 321, 𝐼𝐷2 = 531, 𝐼𝐷3 = 239 and then sends 𝐼𝐷𝑖 to TD.  
TD computes and publics  
 
𝑌1 ≡ 𝑔
𝑓(𝐼𝐷1) mod 𝑝 ≡ 82146mod 14447 ≡ 8300 
 
𝑌2 ≡ 𝑔
𝑓(𝐼𝐷2) mod 𝑝 ≡ 83072mod 14447 ≡ 8450 
 
𝑌3 ≡ 𝑔
𝑓(𝐼𝐷3) mod 𝑝 ≡ 850mod 14447 ≡ 1543 
 
5.2.  (t,n) Threshold signature generation phase  
Assume that the 𝑡 members participating in the signature generation are 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑡. Preceding to 
jointly signing the message, one of these members is appointed as a clerk to perform verification the partial 
signature. We describe the elements of message signing in sequence as follows: 
Each signer selects 𝑘1 = 117 , 𝑘2 = 147, 𝑘3 = 371 and computes  
  
𝑟1 ≡ 8
163(117) mod 14447 ≡ 10094 
 
𝑟2 ≡ 8
237(147) mod 14447 ≡ 2746 
 
𝑟3 ≡ 8
757(371) mod 14447 ≡ 1247 
 
The {𝑟𝑖} are broadcasted through a secure channel to the members. Subsequent to reception of  
the entire 𝑟𝑖, each of them computes the value 𝑅 as 𝑅 = ∏ 𝑟𝑖
3
𝑖=1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) = (10094 × 2746 × 1247)  
mod 𝑝 ≡ 9787 Calculates 𝑣1 = 5195,  𝑣2 = 3174 , 𝑣3 = 1583. 
Then send 𝑅 along with (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) , representing the hash-function message ℎ(𝑚) partial signature, to the clerk. 
Subsequent to validation of entire partial signatures by the clerk, s/he determines solution of  
 𝑉2 = 𝜆−2 ∑ 𝜈𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁) for 𝑉 , 𝑉
2 = 1172(2894)mod 7223 ≡ 4181. 
 
5.3.  (𝒕, 𝒏) Threshold signature verification phase 
Any newcomer is able to perform verification of the signature granted that s/he can access the public 








𝑅𝑅 ≡ 8853418197879787(mod 14447) ≡ 3768 
 
𝑌ℎ(𝑚) ≡ 10022801(mod 14447) ≡ 3768 
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6. CONCLUSION 
A new technique for ID-based threshold group signature was proposed, which is founded on  
the problems of residuosity and discrete logarithm. The technique relies on two difficult hard problems and 
offers an improved level of security relative to an individual difficult problem. Also, we have investigated 
some potential attacks and demonstrated the security of the scheme against such attacks. In addition, the 
scheme is resistant to both of repeat and conspiracy attacks. Moreover, each of group signature and group 
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